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  This study examines the relationship between corporate governance’s mechanisms and liquidity 
of stocks on 66 selected firms listed on Tehran Stock Exchange over the period 2005-2009. 
Board composition and ownership structure are used as corporate governance’s mechanisms 
and illiquidity measure proposed by Amihud (2002) [Amihud, Y. (2002). Illiquidity and stock 
returns: cross-section and time-series effects. Journal of financial markets, 5(1), 31-56.] is used 
to measure stock liquidity. The results show that an increase on the number of independent 
boards is associated with higher liquidity. In addition, the results show that there was a 
significant relationship between liquidity and ownership structure. In other words, the 
relationships between liquidity and individual investors and five biggest investors are positive 
and the relationships between liquidity and institutional ownership and the biggest investor 
ownership are negative. In addition, there is not a significant relationship between liquidity and 
duality of managers.               
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the primary concerns on most stock exchanges is to increase the liquidity level and increase 
the number of shares traded and there are many studies associated with this issue (Datar  et al., 1998; 
Subrahmanyam, 1991; Ajinkya et al., 2005; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002, 2005; Chung et al., 2010). 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005), for instance, solved explicitly a simple equilibrium model with 
liquidity risk and reported that a persistent negative shock to a security's liquidity could yield in low 
contemporaneous returns and high predicted future returns. Amihud (2002) explained that over time, 
expected market illiquidity positively influences ex ante stock excess return, implying that expected 
stock excess return partly could represent an illiquidity premium. The difference between bid and ask 
normally describes liquidity and there are some investigations on the difference between bid and ask 
(Glosten & Milgrom, 1985).    1118
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) investigated the impact of the bid-ask spread on asset pricing and 
analyzed a model in which investors with various expected holding periods trade assets with various 
relative spreads. They reported that market-observed expected return was an increasing and concave 
function of the spread. Amihud et al. (1999) provided some similar investigation and results on 
Japanese stock exchange. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) investigated the relationship between 
the number of analysts following a security and the estimated adverse selection expense of 
transacting in the security, controlling for the impacts of previously identified determinants of 
liquidity.  
 
Brockman and Chung (2003) investigated the relationship between investor protection and firm 
liquidity and reported that firm liquidity was significantly influenced by investor protection. Chen 
and Jaggi (2001) did a survey to find out whether comprehensive financial disclosures, applied as a 
proxy for corporate board’s responsiveness, were positively associated with the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors (INDs) on corporate boards, and whether family control of the 
firm maintained any effect on this association. They reported that the ratio of INDs to the total 
number of directors on corporate boards was positively associated with the comprehensiveness of 
financial disclosures, and this association seemed to be weaker for family controlled companies 
compared with non-family controlled firms.  
 
Cueto (2009) performed another investigation on market liquidity and ownership structure with weak 
protection for minority shareholders. Dumitrescu (2010) investigated the relationship 
between  corporate governance and market liquidity and state that corporate governance could 
significantly influence on market liquidity. Foo and Zain (2010) investigated the effects of board 
independence, board diligence on liquidity of stocks in Malaysia and reported that these two variables 
could influence liquidity of stocks. Jacoby and Zheng (2010) investigated the relationship between 
ownership dispersion and market liquidity.  
 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) performed an investigation to find out how corporate boards and audit 
committees were associated with voluntary financial disclosure practices. They reported that in 
companies with more effective board and audit committee structures, managers were more likely to 
make or update an earnings forecast, and their forecast was less likely to be precise, it was more 
accurate, and it elicited a more favorable market response. Another issue, which could influence 
negatively on trading stocks, is associated with insider trading (Meulbroek, 1992). Rhee and Wang 
(2009) studied the effects of foreign institutional ownership and stock market liquidity in Indonesia 
and reported that foreign holdings had a negative effect on future liquidity.  
 
2. The proposed study  
 
This study examines the relationship between corporate governance’s mechanisms and liquidity of 
stocks on selected firms listed on Tehran Stock Exchange over the period 2005-2009. The main 
hypothesis of this survey is as follows, 
 
Main hypothesis: There is a positive and meaningful relationship between corporate governance’s 
mechanisms and liquidity of stocks (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Lang et al., 2003). 
 
To examine the main hypothesis of the survey, we consider the following six hypotheses, 
 
1.  There is a positive and meaningful relationship between the relative extent of nonexecutive to 
executive directors and liquidity of stocks (Merton, 1987; Mendelson et al., 2004).  
2.  There is a significant difference between the liquidity of the firms with complex management 
components and the liquidity of the firms with non-complex management component. A. Arazpour and M. E. Fadaeinejad / Management Science Letters 4 (2014) 
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3.  There is a meaningful relationship between institutional ownership structure and liquidity of 
stocks (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). 
4.  There is a meaningful relationship between the ownership ratios of the five biggest 
shareholders and liquidity of stocks (Rubin, 2007). 
5.  There is a meaningful relationship between the ownership ratios of the biggest shareholders 
and liquidity of stocks (Vafeas, 1999) 
6.  There is a meaningful relationship between the number of shares owned by individual 
shareholders and liquidity of stocks (Welker, 1995).  
 
In our survey, BOARDC represents the relative extent of nonexecutive to executive directors. To 
measure complex management components we consider a dummy variable, which is one if managing 
director is also chair of directors and zero, otherwise. In addition, BIGOL represents the shares of the 
biggest shareholder, FBIGOL states the shares of the five biggest shareholders, INSTOL represents 
the institutional ownership ratio, which shows the number of shares owned by banks or financial 
institutions. In this survey, Board composition and ownership structure are used as corporate 
governance’s mechanisms and illiquidity measure proposed by Amihud (2002) is used to measure 
stock liquidity. In addition, liquidity is calculated as follows, 
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(1)  
  
where  ILLIQit,  Ridt , Vidt  and  Dit  represent the illiquidity of share, daily return, daily volume of 
transactions and the number of trading shares of share i at time t, respectively. There are three control 
variables including debts ratio, firm size and volume of trades. In our survey, LEV represents debt 
ratio, which is calculated as a ratio of total liabilities on total assets, SIZE represents the size of the 
firm, which is calculated as taking a natural logarithm on daily market value and finally VOLUME 
represents the volume of transactions, which measures the amount of shares traded on daily basis. 
The proposed study considers the following regression analysis, 
 
LIQUIDITYit = α + (β1BOARDCit) + (β2BIGOLit) + (β3FBIGOLit) + (β4INSTOLit) + 
(β5INDVOLit) + (β6DUALITYt)+ (β7LEVit) + (β8SIZEit) + (β9VOLUMEit) + εit. 
(2)  
 
 
The process selects firms from Tehran Stock Exchanges and all the necessary information must be 
available during the course of investigation. Table 1 shows some basic statistics associated with our 
investigation. 
 
Table 1 
The results of some basic statistics associated with the proposed study  
Variable   Mean   Median   Standard deviation  
BOARDC   0.4904    0.6   0.3302   
DUALITY   0.0684    0.0   0.2529   
BIGOL   0.4689   0.4844   0.1802  
FBIGOL   0.7073   0.7308   0.1526  
INSTOL   0.4112    0.3673   0.2579   
INDVOL   0.5891    0.6326   0.2581   
ILLIQ   0.00093    0.00025   0.00189   
VOLUME   345782433296   81174802871   646733607296  
SIZE   27.4   27.21   1.5096  
LEV   0.5835   0.5869   0.2121  
   
3. The results 
 
The proposed study uses stepwise regression analysis and Fig. 1 demonstrates the residuals.   1120
 
Fig. 1. The results of residuals 
 
Based on the results of Fig. 1, we understand that all residuals are normally distributed. Table 2 
demonstrates the results of regression analysis. 
 
Table 2 
The summary of regression analysis 
Variable   β   statistics   t   Results VIF Sig.
BOARDC   2.629   35.64   Confirmed 5.527 0
DUALITY   1.143   0.912   Not Confirmed 1.498 0.363  
BIGOL   -0.081   -3.071   Not Confirmed 3.83 0.002  
FBIGOL   0.127   4.683   Confirmed 2.181 0
INSTOL   -0.899   26.489 -   Not Confirmed 7.769 0
INDVOL   0.967   30.682   Confirmed 6.592 0
VOLUME   ) 3.073  ×
14 - 10 (   0.055 -   Not Confirmed 1.15 0.956  
SIZE   3.132 ×
12 - 10   1.833   Not Confirmed 1.267 0.068  
LEV   3.199   1.953   Not Confirmed 2.12 0.052  
 F-value = 65.45  P-value = 0.000, R
2 = 0.979 Adjusted R
2 = 0.959 
 
As we can observe from the results of Table 2, all VIF numbers are between 0.1 and 10 and we can 
conclude that there is not any co-linearity. In addition, F-value is meaningful when the level of 
significance is one percent and Adjusted R-Square is equal to 0.959, which means the independent 
variables of regression describe approximately 96% of the changes on dependent variable. The results 
indicate that the effects of BOARDC, FBIGOL and INDVOL are significant.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper has investigated the relationship between corporate governance’s mechanisms and 
liquidity of stocks on 66 selected firms listed on Tehran Stock Exchange over the period 2005-2009. 
Board composition and ownership structure are used as corporate governance’s mechanisms and 
illiquidity measure proposed by Amihud (2002) has been applied to measure stock liquidity. The 
results have shown that an increase on the number of independent boards was associated with higher 
liquidity. In addition, there was a significant relationship between liquidity and ownership structure. 
In other words, the relationships between liquidity and individual investors and five biggest investors 
are positive and the relationships between liquidity and institutional ownership and the biggest 
investor ownership are negative. In addition, there is not a significant relationship between liquidity 
and duality of managers.               
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